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Abstract
Tax changes are often announced before their implementation and are not perma-
nent, but rather only temporary. Accordingly, R&D rms will optimally adjust their
investment decisions to t tax schedule changes. This study analyzes how changes in
various tax rates relevant to corporate activities aect growth and welfare, consider-
ing their methods of implementation. For this purpose, we consider adjustment costs
involved in the investment process and allow rms to make a forward looking invest-
ment decision in a R&D-based endogenous growth model. Calibrating the model with
U.S. data, we nd that a dividend tax cut reduces the level of welfare irrespective
of implementation method. On the other hand, a capital gains tax cut and a rise in
the R&D tax credit rate enhance the level of welfare irrespective of implementation.
However, the announcement of these tax changes prior to implementation reduces
their eectiveness.
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1 Introduction
Technological progress achieved through R&D activities is a major source of economic
growth. Firms decide upon the scope of their investment in R&D, considering the costs
and benets of these R&D activities, whose values are dependent upon the applicable
statutory tax rate. As Hall and Van Reenen (2000) point out, scal incentives for R&D
investments dier across countries and change over time. The purpose of this study is to
provide the clear policy implications arising from tax changes relevant to R&D activities
in the context of a R&D-based endogenous growth model.
The novel feature of our study is its focus on growth and welfare not only of unantici-
pated tax changes, which have permanent implementation periods, but also of anticipated
and temporary tax changes. Accordingly, we consider an environment where technologi-
cal progress is driven by in-house R&D by long-lived value-maximizing rms, and these
rms make forward-looking investment decisions regarding in-house R&D activities. In
the real world, tax changes are usually announced before their implementation and are
not permanent but rather only temporary. In such a situation, rms and households have
an opportunity to adjust their intertemporal behavior to t the tax schedule. For better
understanding of taxation policy ecacy, it is important to consider what dierences arise
depending on how tax changes are implemented.
The present analysis is based on a recent endogenous growth model developed by
Peretto (2007, 2011). Specically, the model considers an economy where long-lived value-
maximizing rms continuously improve upon the quality of their specic product through
in-house R&D, while simultaneously new rms also enter the market. The model economy
contains two types of investment opportunities, i.e., in-house R&D (quality improving)
and the creation of a new rm (product proliferation). The model has the advantage of
eliminating the well-known undesirable scale eect [Jones (1995)], while keeping the pol-
icy eect property, which is supported by a growing body of recent empirical literature.1
1The rst generation R&D-based endogenous growth model [e.g. Romer(1990) and Grossman and
Helpman (1991)] predicts that the equilibrium growth rate is increasing in the labor endowment. However,
Jones (1995a) refutes this assertion using time-series data covering the post-war period. Then, the following
two prominent model types are developed. The former type is referred to as the semi-endogenous growth
type [e.g. Jones (1995b) and Segerstrom (1998)]. They resolve the undesirable scale eect property by
2
Increases in the scale of the aggregate economy are perfectly fragmented by endogenous
product proliferation. Aggregate growth is driven by quality growth arising from rm's
in-house R&D activities. The intensity of in-house R&D is dependent on the demand for
intermediate goods at the individual rm level, not the aggregate level.2
However, in the model of Peretto (2007, 2011), a rm's investment decision regarding
in-house R&D turns out to be a static problem. This occurs because the model assumes
that the production function of in-house R&D is linear. This implies that the current
intensity of in-house R&D reects only on current market conditions and tax rates, not
future variables. As a result, if anticipated and temporary tax changes are incorporated
into the model's setting, the dynamic response of rm's investment decisions could not be
considered, and thus the actual impact of such tax shocks could not be captured.
To overcome this problem, we incorporate a framework of the adjustment costs of
investment as used in the literature of investment theory.3 More specically, we assume that
rms require the convex adjustment costs associated with in-house R&D investments. This
specication is indeed more realistic. Some empirical literature points out the existence of
high adjustment costs for R&D investments [e.g., Bernstein and Nadiri (1989), Himmelberg
and Petersen (1994), and Brown and Petersen (2011)]. In the presence of adjustment costs,
rms' investment decisions regarding in-house R&D are a forward-looking problem. The
dynamic system of an economy is also characterized by the (tax-adjusted) shadow value
of in-house R&D, which determines the intensity of in-house R&D.4 The shadow value
assuming the diminishing returns in R&D production technologies. This specication yields the result that
the steady state growth rate is only pinned down to population growth rate. By contrast, the latter type
is referred as the fully-endogenous type [e.g. Peretto (1998), Howitt (1999) and Futagami and Ohkusa
(2003)]. They assume that both vertical innovation and horizontal innovation occur. This specication
yields the conclusion that the steady-state growth rate is also dependent on the other parameters and
policy variables. A recent growing body of empirical literature [e.g. Laincz and Peretto (2006), Ha and
Howitt (2007), and Ang and Madsen (2011)] report that the latter type performs well, rather than the
former type.
2This prediction is consistent with many empirical studies [e.g. Cohen and Klepper (1996), Adams and
Jae (1996), and Pagano and Schivardi (2003)].
3See, for example, Hayashi (1982), Abel (1982), and Abel and Blanchard (1983)
4In Peretto (2007), the dynamic system of the economy is characterized by only one state variable (the
number of rms per capita). In Peretto (2011), it is characterized by one state variable (the number of
rms per capita) and one jump variable (consumption ratio). On the other hand, the dynamic system of
the model used in our analysis is characterized by not only the number of rms per capita and consumption
ratio but also one additional jump variable (shadow value of innovation).
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summarizes all informations relevant to in-house R&D investment decisions. The exibility
provided by the shadow value is very useful in analyzing how investment decisions regarding
in-house R&D dynamically react to both anticipated and temporary tax changes.
Using this modied model, we study the policy implications of (1) a dividend tax cut,
(2) a corporate tax cut, (3) a capital gains tax cut, and (4) a rise in the R&D tax credit
rate, taking into account dierences arising depending on tax change implementation meth-
ods. Calibrating the model with U.S. data, we obtain the following main results. First, a
dividend tax cut reduces the level of welfare irrespective of implementation method. Af-
ter the tax cut is implemented, it is detrimental to in-house R&D and aggregate growth.
However, the anticipation of a dividend tax cut stimulates in-house R&D and aggregate
growth during the announcement phase. Although the overall welfare eect remains neg-
ative, pre-announcement of the tax cut mitigates the resultant welfare losses. Second, the
policy eect of a corporate tax cut depends upon whether or not in-house R&D expen-
ditures are tax deductible. If in-house R&D expenditures are not deductible, a corporate
tax cut leads to higher economic growth and welfare gains irrespective of implementation.
However, if they are fully (or partially) deductible, the policy eect mirrors that observed
for the dividend tax cut. On the other hand, a capital gains tax cut and a rise in the R&D
tax credit rate improve the level of welfare irrespective of implementation method. Af-
ter implementation, they stimulate in-house R&D and aggregate growth. However, these
anticipated tax changes are detrimental to in-house R&D and aggregate growth during
the announcement phase. Therefore, although the overall welfare eect remains positive,
pre-announcement of these tax changes worsens their eectiveness.
Our results have implications regarding the following important channels. First, tax
changes have a direct but dierent eect on both after-tax gross cash ow and rms' cost
of in-house R&D. For example, during the announcement phase, the anticipated dividend
tax cut increases future after-tax gross cash ow, whereas it does not change the cost of in-
house R&D. As a result, rms dynamically adjust the timing of in-house R&D investments
in reaction to the tax schedule. Second, tax changes also aect incentives to create a new
rm and thus impinge on endogenous rm entry. This determines the scale of production
at the individual-rm level given an aggregate market size, which in turn aects incentives
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for rms to engage in R&D in-house. In addition, households can dynamically adjust the
timing of consumption (saving), resulting in a general equilibrium eect.
Peretto (2007, 2011) examined the policy eect of tax changes relevant to corporate
R&D activities. In particular, Peretto (2007, 2011) mainly focuses on the policy eect of a
dividend tax cut such as the U.S.'s Jobs Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003. Specically, Peretto (2007) analyzes the revenue-neutral tax changes in an environ-
ment where the dividend tax rate is endogenously determined to balance the government's
budget constraint and shows that lowering the corporate tax rate and capital gains tax
rate or increasing the R&D tax credit rate can lead to higher economic growth and im-
prove welfare levels. Peretto (2011) analyzes the case where the government can nance
the outlay required by tax changes via debt, and quantitatively shows that a dividend tax
cut leads to the slowdown of in-house R&D and aggregate growth, and thus leads to sub-
stantial welfare losses. The dierences between our study and that of Peretto (2011) are
as follows. First, Peretto (2007, 2011) focuses only on unanticipated and permanent tax
changes. On the other hand, we also consider anticipated and temporary tax changes in
an environment where rms dynamically react to these tax changes. Second, we examine
the eectiveness of alternative policy instruments rather than the dividend tax cut in an
environment where the government nances with debt as just in Peretto (2011).
Our study is also related to the following previous studies. Zeng and Zhang (2002) and
Peretto (2003) also study the eects of tax changes on the basis of a non-scale R&D-based
growth model. However, both these studies analyze only unanticipated and permanent
tax changes and do not consider transitional dynamics and welfare implications. Summers
(1981) and Abel (1982) analyze how anticipated and temporary tax changes aect rms'
forward-looking investment decisions by using the framework of adjustment costs for invest-
ment. However, their analysis are based on the partial equilibrium approach. As a result,
they can not consider the impacts on aggregate growth and welfare. Strulik and Trimborn
(2010) study the eects of anticipated and temporary tax changes in a general equilibrium
setting. Their model is based on the neoclassical growth model with endogenous corporate
nance, making the steady-state growth rate exogenous in this setting.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
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characterizes the dynamic system and the steady-state equilibrium of the market economy.
Section 4 quantitatively analyzes the transitional adjustment of macroeconomic variables
to tax changes and welfare consequences, calibrating the model with U.S. data. Section 5
analyzes the sensitivity of the numerical analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes the study.
2 The model
In this section, we establish our model, which is based on that of Peretto (2011). Time
is continuous. The economy is closed and consists of a nal goods sector, an intermediate
goods sector, households, and government. Perfect competition prevails in the nal goods
sector, while monopolistic competition prevails in the intermediate goods sector. Both the
labor and asset markets are competitive. All scal variables either change only at discrete
events or remain static. Thus, we can treat them parametrically and omit the time index
t.
2.1 Final goods sector
The price of nal goods is set to be the numeraire. Final goods are consumed by households
and used as only one factor of production and investment by the intermediate goods sector.
The nal goods, Yt is produced by the following production function:
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xit
 
Zit
Z1 t Lit
1 
di; 0 < ;  < 1; (1)
where Nt is the variety of intermediate goods (the number of intermediate goods rms),
Xit is the input of intermediate goods i 2 [0; Nt] (produced by rm i), and Lit is the
input of labor that uses intermediate goods i. The productivity of Lit depends not only
on the quality of intermediate good i, Zit, but also on the average quality level across
all intermediate goods, Zt 
R Nt
0
1
Nt
Zjtdj. Therefore, we obtain the following optimal
conditions:
Xit =


Pit
 1
1   
Zit Z
1 
t Lit

; (2)
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Lit =

1  
Wt
 1

Xit
 
Zit
Z1 t
 1 
 ; (3)
where Pit and Wt represent the price of intermediate good i and the labor wage rate,
respectively.
2.2 Intermediate goods sector
Firm i exclusively produces its dierentiated good at quality, Zit. Each rm's monopoly is
permanently protected by perfect patent protection. Producing one unit of intermediate
goods requires one unit of nal goods. Firms improve the quality of their specic product
through their in-house R&D. In contrast to Peretto (2007, 2011), however, we assume that
given increases in rm-specic quality level, Rit  0, involve adjustment costs associated
with innovation, following a la Hayashi (1982) specication. Specically, the law of motion
pertaining to rm-specic quality is
_Zit = Rit; (4)
and the amount of R&D expenditure is given by
(Rit; Zit) = Rit +
h
2
R2it
Zit
; (5)
where h > 0 reects the extent of adjustment costs associated with in-house R&D and the
case of h = 0 corresponds to the specication of Peretto (2007, 2011).5
At each point in time, xed operating costs,  Zt ( > 0), are imposed. Accordingly,
the gross cash ow is Fit = (Pit   1)Xit    Zt, where the rst term represents revenue
minus variable production costs and the second term represents xed operating costs. Let
 represent the rate of R&D tax credits (the fraction of R&D expenditure that rms are
allowed to deduct from their corporate taxable amount).6 The total amount of corporate
tax is  [Fit   (Rit; Zit)], where  represents the corporate tax rate. The gross cash
5This functional form is based on Turnovsky (2000).
6Although  is assumed to be zero for simplication in Peretto (2011), we follow the specication of
Peretto (2007) so that we can consider the eects of the tax credit policy for R&D investment as well.
7
ow must therefore be distributed as follows:
Fit =  [Fit   (Rit; Zit)] + Eitdit + Jit;
where Eit is the number of equities, dit is the pre-tax dividends on a per-share basis, and Jit
is the retained earnings. A rm's nancial constraint is written by Jit+ _Eitvit = (Rit; Zit),
where _Eit and vit represent the number of newly issued equities and the equity price on a
per-share basis, respectively. Since we do not consider here the case where in-house R&D
is nanced by a bond issue, the above identity indicates that in-house R&D investments
must be nanced by retaining earnings, newly issued equities, or both.7 Along the lines of
Peretto (2011), we focus only on the scenario where the marginal source of in-house R&D
is limited only to retaining earnings. The scenario is called \New view" in the corporate
nance literature. In this scenario, (Rit; Zit) = Jit because _Eit = 0.
Let Vit  Eitvit and Dit  Eitdit. Without loss of generality, Eit is normalized to one.
Dividends is given by
Dit = (1  )Fit   (1  )(Rit; Zit): (6)
The return on equity can be rewritten by
rt = (1  D)Dit
Vit
+ (1  V )
_Vit
Vit
: (7)
where D is the dividend tax rate and V is the capital gains tax rate.
Integrating (7) yields the value of rm i as follows:
Vit =
Z 1
t
exp
Z s
t
  1
1  V rvdv

1  D
1  V

[(1  )Fis   (1  )(Ris; Zis)] ds:
Throughout this exercise, we consider a symmetric equilibrium by assuming that any new
rm starts with the same technology level as incumbents so that the subscript i can be
dropped. In the equilibrium, Zt = Zt holds. Each rm maximizes its value, subject to
7See Turnovsky (1990) for a detailed discussion.
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(2) and (4), given Z. To solve the inter-temporal maximization problem, we dene the
following current-value Hamiltonian as
H  1  D
1  V [(1  )Ft   (1  )(Rt; Zt)] + qt [Rt] ;
where the co-state variable, qt, represents a shadow value for in-house R&D. We obtain
the following optimal conditions:
Pt =
1

; (8)
qt =
(1  D)(1  )
(1  V )

1 + h
Rt
Zt

; (9)
rt = (1  D)(1  )@Ft
@Zt
1
qt
+ (1  D)(1  )h
2

Rt
Zt
2
1
qt
+ (1  V ) _qt
qt
: (10)
The transversality condition is lims!1 exp

  1
1 V
R s
t
rvdv

Zsqs = 0. From (4) and (9),
the quality growth rate is given by
z^t 
_Zt
Zt
=
8>>>><>>>>:
1
h
24 (1  V )
(1  D)(1  )qt   1
35  1
h
[~qt   1] ; if ~qt > 1;
0; if ~qt  1:
(11)
(8) represents the pricing rule with constant mark-up. (9) indicates that rms invest
in-house R&D up to the point where the shadow value of in-house R&D (RHS) equals
the actual cost of in-house R&D (LHS). Since in-house R&D is funded only by retain-
ing earnings, the outlay of one dollar for in-house R&D decreases dividend payments for
shareholders by (1 D)(1 )
(1 V ) . Thus, reductions in the dividend tax rate and corporate tax
rate increase the cost of in-house R&D, whereas reductions in the capital gains tax rate
and a higher R&D tax credit rate lowers the cost of in-house R&D.8 (10) represents the
no-arbitrage condition between the return on equity and that on in-house R&D. Hereafter,
we call ~qt  (1 V )(1 D)(1 )qt as modied q along the lines of Hayashi (1982). If there are no
8If  = 0, a decrease in the corporate tax does not change the cost of in-house R&D.
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adjustment costs (h = 0), modied q always pins down to one.9 By contrast, in our setting,
modied q is endogenously determined and has a transitional process in equilibrium. (11)
shows that the rate of quality growth is an increasing function of modied q. Since modi-
ed q is derived from rms' intertemporal optimization problem, all informations relevant
to in-house R&D decisions are summarized by modied q.
Developing new products requires Zt ( > 1). New entry rms are nanced by issuing
equity. Free-entry conditions yields
Vt = Zt , _Nt > 0: (12)
From (6) and (12), the return on equity, (7), can be rewritten by
rt = (1  D)

(1  ) Ft
Zt
  (1  )(Rt; Zt)
Zt

+ (1  V )
_Zt
Zt
: (13)
2.3 Households
The model's economy has identical households. Each individual household member is
identically endowed with one unit of time and provides labor supply elastically. The
population grows at a constant rate,  > 0. Without loss of generality, the population size
at time 0 is normalized to one. Hence, the number of population at time t is given by et.
Households maximize the following utility function:
Ut =
Z 1
t
e ( )(s t)

logCse
 s +  log (1  ls)

ds;
where Ct is the aggregate consumption, lt is the fraction of time allocated to work per
capita,  > 0 is the measure of preference for leisure, and  (> ) is the rate of the time
preference. The household budget constraint is given by
_NtVt = Nt
h
(1  D)Dt   V _Vt
i
+ (1  L)Wtltet   (1 + C)Ct   Tt;
9See Peretto (2007, 2011).
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where L is the labor income tax rate, C is the consumption tax rate, and Tt is the lump-
sum tax. Solving the inter-temporal optimization problem yields the following optimal
conditions:
_Ct
Ct
= rt   + ; (14)
lt = 1  (1 + C)Ct
(1  L)Wtet : (15)
The transversality condition is lims!1 e ( )(s t)ass = 0, where t represents the shadow
value of holdings assets.
2.4 Government
Government spending is given by Gt = gYt (0 < g < 1), where the share of the government
spending to outputs is assumed to be exogenously given. Along the lines of Peretto (2007,
2011), it is assumed that government spending does not aect a household's utility or
the eciency of production activities. This allows the eects of distortionary taxes to be
isolated from the eects of government expenditure. The government's budget constraint
is given by
Gt = LWte
tlt + CCt + Nt [Ft   (Zt; Rt)] + DNtDt + VNt _Vt + Tt:
Since the Ricardian equivalence holds, the same equilibrium dynamics occurs as in the
economy with public debt.
3 Market equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium dynamics
In this section, we derive the dynamic system of market equilibrium. The market equilib-
rium condition of nal goods is given by
Yt = Gt + Ct +Nt [Xt + Zt + (Zt; Rt)] + Zt _Nt: (16)
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Dene the number of rms per capita as nt  Nt=et and the ratio of the aggregate
consumption to outputs as ct  Ct=Yt. With full proof presented in Appendix 1, the labor
supply per capita is given by
l(ct) =
1
1 +  ct
;    (1 + C)
(1  L)(1  ) > 0: (17)
The reduced-form aggregate production function of nal goods is given by
Yt = 
l(ct)e
tZt; 
   21  : (18)
For simplifying the notation, we hereafter dene
S  (1  V )
(1  D)(1  ) and  
1  
1   :
In Appendix 2, we provide proof for the following simultaneous dierential equation, which
constitutes the economy's dynamical system (in the case where ~qt > 1):
_nt =

1  2   g   ct
 
l(ct)

 

+
(Sqt)
2   1
2h
+ 

nt

; (19)
_ct = ct [1 +  ct]

rt     Sqt   1
h

; (20)
_qt =
1
1  V rtqt  
(1  )
S

l(ct)
nt
  (Sqt   1)
2
2Sh
; (21)
where the interest rate (return on equity) is given by
rt =
(1  V )
S
"
(1  )
l(ct)
nt
     (Sqt)
2   1
2h
#
+ (1  V )Sqt   1
h
: (22)
See Appendix 3 for proof of the dynamic system in the case where ~qt  1.
3.2 Steady-state equilibrium
Let yt  Yt=(ltet), which represents the output per worker. From (18), the growth rate of
output per worker is given by y^t  _yt=yt = z^t = (~qt 1)=h. In what follows, we characterize
12
the steady-state equilibrium, fn; c; ~q( Sq); l; r; y^g. From (20), _ct = 0 and c > 0
implies (if ~q > 1)
r = +
~q   1
h
: (23)
From (21), _qt = 0 and ~q
 > 1 implies
r = (1  V )(1  )


l(c)
n
1
~q
+ (1  V )(~q
   1)2
2h
1
~q
: (24)
This equation represents the no-arbitrage condition between the return on in-house R&D
and that on equity in the steady-state equilibrium. Other things being equal, a dividend
tax cut has no direct impact on the return from in-house R&D. A dividend tax cut boosts
a rm's after-tax gross cash ow and thus enhances the benet derived from quality growth
through in-house R&D. But the tax cut also increases the cost of in-house R&D, as pre-
viously discussed. As described in public nance literature [e.g. Summers (1981) and
Hassett and Hubbard (2002)], the eects of the dividend tax cut cancel each other out. On
the other hand, a corporate tax cut, a capital gains tax cut, and an increase in the R&D
tax credit rate directly enhance the return on in-house R&D. From (23) and (24), we can
determine that eliminating r yields (if ~q > 1)

l(c)
n
=

(1  )

1
1  V

+
~q   1
h

~q   (~q
   1)2
2h

: (25)
Substituting (23) and (25) in (22), we nd that ~q is derived by solving f(~q) = 0 with
respect to ~q where
f(~q) 
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1
1  V
24+ ~q   1
h
35 (S   ~q) + (~q   1)2
2h
+ 
~q2   1
2h
 S
~q   1
h
+


; if ~q > 1;

1  V (S   ~q) +


; if ~q  1:
(26)
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If S  1   (1 V )

< 1, f(1)  0 and f 0(~q) < 0. In such a case, no steady-state
equilibrium exists with a positive quality growth rate. If 1  (1 V )

< S, f(1) > 0. In
such a case, f(~q) is depicted, as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that if 1  (1 V )

<
S, then ~q is uniquely determined at the point where ~q is higher than 1. In what
follows, we focus on the case where 1   (1 V )

< S. In such a case, there exists a
unique steady-state equilibrium with a positive rate of quality growth. See Appendix 4 for
proof.
~q0
f(~q)
1 10 ~q~q ~q
f(1) f(1)
Figure 1: The steady-state equilibrium: the left (right) gure represents the case where f(~q) is
inverted U-shapes (monotonically decreasing in ~q) for ~q > 1.
Since the Jacobian matrix derived from the linear approximation of (19)-(21) in the
neighborhood of the steady-state equilibrium is complicated, we cannot analytically exam-
ine the dynamic system's local stability. However, our numerical simulations conrm that
the unique steady state is locally saddle-point stable in the benchmark setting and in the
subsequent sensitivity analysis, as shown below.10
10Since the dynamic system has one state variable (nt) and two jump variables (ct and qt), it must
have two positive characteristic roots and one negative characteristic root to assure that the unique steady
state is saddle-point stable. Our numerical simulation reports that the value of three characteristic root
corresponding to the dynamic system are  0:4129, 0:2240, and 0:1478 in the benchmark parameter setting.
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From (19) and (25), _nt = 0 and n
 > 0 implies
c =

1  2   g  (1  )
'(~q)

+
~q2   1
2h
+ 

;
where
'(~q)  
1  V

+
~q   1
h

~q    (~q
   1)2
2h
:
Rewriting (25) yields
n =
(1  )
l(c)
'(~q)
:
The mechanism that eliminates the scale eect on the steady-state growth rate of output
is consistent with the case where adjustment costs are absent [Peretto (2007, 2011)]. In
the steady-state equilibrium, modied q is independent of the scale factor for the economy,
l(c) [see (26)]. Increases in the economy's scale factor lead to higher aggregate demand
for intermediate goods at the individual rm level. This larger scale of production at the
individual rm level allows in-house R&D expenditures to be spread over a greater number
of units of goods, thus having a direct positive eect on incentives for a rm to engage in
R&D in-house. This eect is called the cost-spreading eect. However, higher aggregate
demand for intermediate goods also attracts new rms to enter the market as rm values
rise. Thus, the per-rm market share of intermediate goods demand shrinks. This reduces
the scale of production at the individual rm level, which in turn lowers incentives to
conduct in-house R&D activities. This eect is called the market share eect. In the
steady-state equilibrium, the market share eect derived from higher aggregate demand
for intermediate goods perfectly cancels out the cost-spreading eect [see discussion in
Peretto (2007)].11
11Furthermore, we conrm that the comparative statics of the parameters in the steady-state equilibrium
obtain similar results to those in Peretto (2007, 2011). Increases in , , and  enhance the steady-state
growth rate of outputs, respectively. Increases in  allow each rm to more intensely internalize positive
returns derived from its own in-house R&D activities. Increases in  and  make it more dicult for
potential new rms to enter the market, thus reallocating resources from product proliferation to quality
improving. An increase in h reduce the steady-state growth rate of output because it directly increases
the cost of in-house R&D. On the other hand, the eect of  upon the steady-state growth rate of outputs
is ambiguous.
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3.3 Steady-state eect of tax changes
The manner in which a permanent change of tax variables aects quality growth in the
steady-state equilibrium is also consistent with Peretto (2007, 2011). We summarize those
ndings as follows:
Quality growth in the steady-state equilibrium is increasing in the rates of dividend tax and
corporate tax (if   1) and R&D tax credit rate. On the other hand, it is decreasing in
the rate of the corporate tax (if  = 0). Increases in the corporate tax rate (if  2 (0; 1))
and capital gains tax rate have ambiguous eects upon the steady-state quality growth rate.
Proofs can be found in Appendix 5. A dividend tax cut has no direct impact on a
rms' incentive to pursue in-house R&D, as previously discussed. On the other hand, a
dividend tax cut directly enhances the returns on equity. Given the aggregate market
demand for intermediate goods, the number of rms per capita increases. The resulting
product proliferation lowers incentives to conduct in-house R&D through the market share
eect. Thus, a dividend tax cut unambiguously has an unambiguously negative eect on
quality growth.12
On the other hand, a higher R&D tax credit rate has an unambiguously positive eect
on quality growth. It reduces the cost of conducting in-house R&D, which dominates the
other eect so that it functions like a direct subsidy for in-house R&D.
Both a corporate tax cut (if  2 (0; 1)) and a capital gains tax cut have ambiguous
eects on quality growth. These tax cuts directly enhance both the returns on in-house
R&D and on equity. However, if  = 0, it is shown that a corporate tax cut unambiguously
enhances quality growth in the steady state. Furthermore, if  and  are suciently low,
a capital gains tax cut enhances quality growth in the steady state.
12If  = 1, a corporate tax cut also has the same qualitative eect as a dividend tax cut. When in-house
R&D expenditures are fully deductible against corporate tax, no qualitative dierence exists between the
dividend tax and corporate tax.
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4 Numerical analysis
4.1 Data and methodology
Since analytically examining the transitional adjustment of aggregate economy in response
to various tax changes is complicated, we calibrate the model with U.S. data by using
relaxation algorithm method developed by Trimborn, Koch, and Steger (2008).13
As the benchmark, we use the value of all tax variables, following the methodology in
Peretto (2011).14 The values of  and  are set to 0:30 and 0:04, respectively, which are
conventional values in the macroeconomic literature. The value of  is set to 0:01, which
is consistent with the average annual population growth rate in the U.S. economy. The
parameter choice associated with adjustment costs, h, is less clear. According to Schubert
and Turnovsky (2011), the parameter of adjustment costs for physical capital investment is
generally assumed to fall within 10-15 in the literature [e.g., Ortigueira and Santos (1997)
and Auerbach and Kotliko (1987)]. Bernstein and Nadiri (1989) and Himmelberg and
Petersen (1994) report the extent to which adjustment costs associated with R&D invest-
ment equals or surpasses than that associated with physical capital investment. Therefore
h = 12:0 is employed as the benchmark. The parameter associated with entry costs, , is
also less clear. Following Peretto (2011), we employ  = 6:55 as the benchmark.15 The
values of  and  are set to 0:141 and 0:266, respectively, so that the consumption ratio
and growth rate of output in the steady state are 0:69 and 0:02, respectively.  is set to
1:459 so that the fraction of time devoted to labor supply is 0:33.
Table 1 summarizes the benchmark parameter values. Table 2 reports the values of
key endogenous variables in the steady-state equilibrium, fn; c; ~q; l; r; y^g, which are
characterized under the benchmark parameter setting.
13Trimborn, Koch, and Steger (2008) details the relaxation algorithm. They also provide MAT-
LAB programs for the relaxation algorithm, which are downloadable for free at http://www.wiwi.uni-
siegen.de/vwli/forschung/relaxation/matlab applications.html?lang=de. Using this method, Strulik and
Trimborn (2010) examine how both anticipated and temporary tax reforms aect the aggregate economy
within the framework of the neoclassical (exogenous) growth model.
14R&D costs are in fact fully deductible against corporate tax liability in the U.S. tax code. However,
setting  = 0 allows us to clearly see the fundamental distinction between corporate and dividend taxes. If
R&D costs are assumed to be fully deductible ( = 1:0), then a corporate tax cut has the same qualitative
eects upon the economy as a dividend tax cut.
15See Peretto (2011) for a detailed explanation of this estimation.
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Table 1: Benchmark parameter setting
Parameter Benchmark Value Description
g 0:143 Government expenditure share
D 0:35 Dividend tax rate
 0:0 R&D tax credit rate
 0:335 Corporate tax rate
V 0:20 Capital gains tax rate
C 0:05 Consumption tax rate
L 0:256 Labor income tax rate
 0:141 Appropriable quality
1   0:7 Labor share
h 12:0 The extent of adjustment costs
 0:266 The extent of xed operating costs
 6:55 The extent of entry costs
 1:459 Preference for leisure
 0:04 Time discount rate
 0:01 Population growth rate
Table 2: Steady-state equilibrium values (benchmark)
n c ~q l r y^
0.0256 0.69 1.24 0.33 0.06 0.02
In what follows, we investigate the specic transitional adjustments in key macro vari-
ables and welfare induced by the following specic tax changes: (a) a 10% point reduction
in the dividend tax rate, (b) a 10% point reduction in the corporate tax rate, (c) a 10%
point reduction in the capital gains tax rate, and (d) a 20% point rise in the R&D tax
credit rate. In addition, we consider the following three dierent implementation scenar-
ios: (1) an unanticipated and permanent tax change, (2) an anticipated and permanent
tax change, and (3) an unanticipated and temporary tax change. In every scenario, the
economy initially (at t = 0) remains in the steady-state equilibrium before the tax change.
In implementation scenario (1), each tax change suddenly comes into eect at t = 5 and
lasts forever from that point forward. In implementation scenario (2), all economic agents
expect at t = 0 that each tax change will be implemented at t = 5 and last forever from
that point on. In implementation scenario (3), each tax change comes into eect unexpect-
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edly at t = 0 and but reverts to its initial level after t = 10. This reversion is expected by
all economic agents at t = 0.
Figures 2-5 show the transitional path of key macro variables in response to each tax
change within the dierent implementation scenarios as given above. Specically, each
panel of these gures represents the transitional path of: (1) the number of rms per
capita (nt), (2) the consumption ratio (ct), (3) modied q (~qt), (4) hours worked per capita
(lt), (5) the interest rate (rt), (6) the growth rate of outputs per workers (y^t), (7) the ratio
of after-tax dividend payments to rm value, and (8) the ratio of distortionary tax revenue
to outputs. The horizontal axes in each panel measures years. In the vertical axes, rt and
y^t are measured by their actual values, whereas all the other variables are measured by
their percentage deviation from pre-reform levels.
Table 3 reports welfare consequences arising from the tax changes. Welfare level is
measured as a consumption equivalent: what constant relative increases in annual con-
sumption per capita must be induced so that households' pre-reform utility levels equal
the household utility levels in the case where the economy moves to a new steady-state
equilibrium due to the tax change.16
Table 3: Welfare gains of tax changes (benchmark)
Policy change Unanticipated
(Permanent)
Anticipated
(Permanent)
Temporary
tD =  0:1  14:0  11:17  8:19
t =  0:1 5:03 5:67 0:64
tV =  0:1 13:56 10:78 7:86
 = 0:2 10:86 9:58 4:87
Note: Welfare gains are measured in consumption equivalent and expressed in percentage points.
16More formally, welfare dierences are evaluated as follows. UO0 (c
O; lO; y^O; nO) is dened as a house-
hold's level of the utility in the case where the economy remains in the initial steady-state equilibrium
before a tax change. We dene UN0 (c
N
t ; l
N
t ; y^
N
t ; n
N
t ) as in the case when the economy moves to the new
steady-state equilibrium due to the tax changes. Here, we measure the consumption equivalent by , which
is dened as the value that satises UO0 (c
O(1 + ); lO; y^O; nO) = UN0 (c
N
t ; l
N
t ; y^
N
t ; n
N
t ). See Appendix 6 for
details on how to calculate household utility levels.
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4.2 Dividend tax cut
Figure 2-(a) shows the impulse responses by key macro variables to the 10% point per-
manent dividend tax cut under the benchmark parameter setting. The dashed lines in
the panels of Figure 2-(a) plot the impulse responses in the case where the permanent tax
cut is unanticipated. When the tax cut is implemented (at t = 5), the consumption ratio
and modied q instantaneously fall, whereas the number of rms per capita starts to rise.
These variables gradually converge to the new steady-state level. Hours worked reacts in
a contrary manner against the consumption ratio. The growth rate of output per worker
falls from 0:02 to 0:0148 at t = 5 before it converges to 0:0152. The tax cut is detrimental
to quality growth during all transition phases. Since the tax cut proportionally and per-
manently increases both after-tax gross cash ows and the cost of in-house R&D at the
same time, it therefore has no direct eect on a rm's incentive to conduct in-house R&D.
It only directly increases dividend payments and returns on equity, which lead to product
proliferation.17 This negatively impacts the incentives to in-house R&D.
Table 3 shows that the tax cut carries welfare costs of around 14% points of per capita
annual consumption. The negative welfare consequence results from the decline of con-
sumption and household leisure times as well as the slowdown of quality growth.
If the permanent tax cut is anticipated, then the impulse responses, which are plotted
by the solid lines in Figure 2-(a), become quite dierent. When the news arrives (at
t = 0), households and rms can incorporate the future tax cut and change their inter-
temporal behavior. At t = 0, all variables rather than the state variable (the number of
rms per capita) instantaneously changes. The consumption ratio falls, whereas modied
q jumps up and the growth rate of per worker output rises from 0:02 to 0:025. During
the announcement phase, the consumption ratio further decreases, whereas modied q
increases and the growth rate of per worker output continues to rise. The number of
rms per capita gradually rises through the general equilibrium eect. After the tax cut
is implemented (at t = 5), both the consumption ratio and the number of rms per capita
17The interest rate (returns to equity) jumps at t = 5 as the tax cut directly increases after-tax dividend
payments. During the transition, however, the interest rate gradually decreases, eventually falling below
the pre-reform level because product proliferation lowers both pre-tax dividend payments as well as capital
gains (which equals rate of quality growth) at the individual-rm level.
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gradually increase to converge to a new steady-state level. On the other hand, at t = 5,
modied q and the growth rate of output per worker drastically drops lower than they
were pre-reform values. Then they also converge to a new steady-state level.
Why does a lag in implementing the tax cut have a positive impact on quality growth
during the announcement phase? Recall that the dividend tax cut proportionally increases
both after-tax gross cash ows and the cost of in-house R&D. However, during the an-
nouncement phase, anticipated future tax cuts increases the future after-tax gross cash
ows but do not change the cost of in-house R&D. Since rms can adjust their investment
plan dynamically, the anticipated tax cut has a direct positive eect on a rm's incentive to
conduct in-house R&D activities up to the point when the tax cut is actually implemented.
This positive eect outweighs the negative eect derived from product proliferation during
the announcement phase.
Table 3 shows that the tax cut is estimated to impose the loss of around 11:17% points
of annual consumption per capita, indicating that the welfare costs are mitigated compared
to the welfare eect of an unanticipated tax cut. This outcome reects the fact that the
rate of quality growth temporarily increases during the announcement phase, whereas
consumption and hours worked adjust more smoothly.
Figure 2-(b) shows the impulse responses to a temporary 10% point dividend tax cut
under the benchmark setting. When the tax cut is implemented (at t = 0), all variables
other than the state variable instantaneously change. After the tax cut is terminated
(at t = 10), all variables gradually revert to their pre-reform levels. Remarkably, during
implementation, modied q declines more sharply compared to the case of the permanent
tax cut. At t = 0, the growth rate of output per worker falls to 0:0125 and then decrease
further until the tax cut is terminated, in reaction to the temporary increase in the cost
of conducting in-house R&D. As Table 3 shows, the temporary dividend tax cut yields
welfare costs of an estimated 8:2% points of per capita annual consumption.
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4.3 Corporate tax cut
Figures 3-(a, b) show the impulse responses to a 10% point corporate tax cut under the
benchmark parameter setting. Except for modied q and the growth rate of output per
workers, the impulse responses are qualitatively similar to those found in the case of the
dividend tax cut. If the tax cut is unanticipated, then at t = 5, modied q jumps up and
the growth rate of output per workers rises to 0:0219. These variables then further increase
to the new steady-state level. If the tax cut is anticipated, then at t = 0, modied q jumps
up and the growth rate of output per workers rises to 0:0210. Again, these variables then
further increase to the new steady-state level. If the tax cut is temporary, the eect on
quality growth is also positive during all transitional phases.
Why does the tax cut unambiguously exert a positive impact on the quality growth
during all phases of the transition irrespective of implementation? Recall that under the
benchmark parameter setting, in-house R&D expenditures are not deductible against cor-
porate tax ( = 0). Therefore, while tax cut directly increases after-tax gross cash ows,
it does not change the cost to conduct in-house R&D. Hence, the tax cut has a direct pos-
itive eect on incentives to conduct in-house R&D, and also leads to product proliferation,
which results in a negative eect on incentives to conduct in-house R&D. However, the
former positive direct eect outweighs the latter negative eect. Table 3 shows that the
welfare eect is positive irrespective of implementation method.
4.4 Capital gains tax cut
Figure 4-(a) shows the impulse the responses to the unanticipated (or anticipated) and
permanent 10% point capital gains tax cut under the benchmark parameter setting. Al-
though the steady-state eect of a capital gains tax cut on quality growth is qualitatively
ambiguous, our calibration shows that the tax cut increases the quality growth rate in the
new steady state.18 If the permanent tax cut is unanticipated, modied q initially rises
before converging to the new steady-state level. During all transition phases, the quality
growth rate is higher than its pre-reform level. Table 3 shows that the tax cut yields welfare
18The subsequent robustness checks shows that the steady state eect on quality growth is positive.
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gains of around 13:56% points of per capita annual consumption.
If the permanent tax cut is anticipated, however, quality growth slows during the
announcement phase. The future capital gains tax cut reduces the future cost of conducting
in-house R&D so that rms have an opportunity to dynamically adjust their investment
plans and thus delay in-house R&D investments. This eect dominates the other eects.
Although the overall eect of the capital gains tax cut on welfare remains positive, the
temporary slowdown of quality growth has a negative eect on welfare. On the other hand,
the anticipated tax cut makes household behavior more smoothly, resulting in a positive
eect on welfare. However, the latter positive eect cannot outweigh the former negative
eect. As a result, the anticipated tax cut reduces welfare gains by 2:77% points compared
to the welfare eect of the unanticipated tax cut.
Figure 4-(b) shows the impulse response to a temporary 10% point capital gains tax
cut under the benchmark parameter setting. Remarkably, quality growth accelerates dur-
ing its implementation. This temporary acceleration of quality growth is more signicant
compared to the steady-state eect of the permanent tax cut. Mainly, this occurs because
the temporary tax cut reduces the cost of conducting in-house R&D during its implemen-
tation. As Table 3 shows, the temporary tax cut also yields welfare gains of an estimated
7:86% points of per capita annual consumption.
4.5 Increases in the R&D tax credit rate
Figure 5-(a) shows impulse responses to the unanticipated (or anticipated) 20% point
permanent increase in the R&D tax credit rate under the benchmark parameter setting.
The tax change increases the steady-state rate of quality growth. Remarkably, in the steady
state, the tax changes is shown to be self-nancing: the ratio of distortionary tax revenues
to output is higher than pre-reform levels. If the permanent tax change is unanticipated,
then during all transition phases, both the growth rate of outputs per workers and the
consumption ratio are higher than their pre-reform levels. As Table 3 shows, the tax
change yields welfare gains estimated to be around 10:86% points of per capita annual
consumption.
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On the other hand, if the permanent tax change is anticipated, modied q and the
growth rate of output per workers are lower than their pre-reform levels during the an-
nouncement phase. This ndings parallel that in the case of the anticipated capital gains
tax cut. Future rises of the R&D tax credit rate directly reduce the future cost of con-
ducting in-house R&D, leading rms to delay in-house R&D investments until after the
tax change is implemented. This negative eect dominates the other eects. As a re-
sult, although the tax cut has an overall positive eect on welfare, the implementation
lags from the tax change reduce these welfare gains by 1:28% points of per capita annual
consumption, compared to the welfare eect of the unanticipated tax change.
Figure 5-(b) shows the impulse responses to a temporary 20% point increase in the tax
credit rate under the benchmark parameter setting. The eect on quality growth parallels
that found in the case of the temporary capital gains tax cut. Temporary increases in
the R&D tax credit rate reduce the cost of conducting in-house R&D during its imple-
mentation. Furthermore, the temporary acceleration of quality growth is more signicant
compared to the steady-state eect of the permanent tax change. As Table 3 shows, the
temporary tax change also yields welfare gains estimated to be around 4:87% points of per
capita annual consumption.
5 Sensitivity analysis
5.1 Parameter changes
We now conduct robustness checks for identied tax changes eects by changing certain
parameters. First, we consider increasing or decreasing the value of the unclear parameter,
 and h. Specically, we increase or decrease the values of  and h by 50% points.19 In
all these cases, we re-estimate  and  so that the consumption ratio and the growth rate
of output in the pre-reform steady-state equilibrium remain the same as in the benchmark
parameter setting. We nd that the impulse responses are qualitatively the same as in
the benchmark analysis. As Table 4 reports, the welfare consequences of tax changes are
19If we reduce the value of h by 50% points (i.e., we set to h = 6:0), the growth rate of output per
workers becomes negative. To assure an interior solution, we set h = 8:0 alternatively.
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quantitatively modied but our main ndings in the benchmark analysis qualitatively hold.
Second, we consider the case of  = 1:0. In fact, the U.S. tax code sets  = 1:0 even
though in the benchmark analysis, we set to  = 0:0. Our analysis shows that except
for the case of the corporate tax cut, the impulse responses and welfare consequences
remain qualitatively the same as in the benchmark analysis. We also nd that the impulse
responses to the corporate tax cut are qualitatively the same as those to the dividend tax
cut. As Table 4 reports, the welfare consequence is almost identical to that found in the
dividend tax cut.20 This similarity reects the fact that a corporate tax cut has the same
eects as a divided tax cut if in-house R&D investments are fully tax deductible.
We then consider the case in which labor supply is inelastic (i.e.,  = 0). The impulse
responses in  = 0 are qualitatively the same as those found in the benchmark analysis.
As Table 4 reports, the welfare consequences of tax changes are quantitatively modied
but our main ndings in the benchmark analysis qualitatively hold.
5.2 Social returns to product variety
In the model as described thus far, and as (18) shows, the number of rms (product
variety) per capita does not directly contribute to the production of nal goods. Given
the aggregate market demand for intermediate goods, changes in the number of rms per
capita merely aect the market structure for intermediate goods rms. The policy that
leads to a higher number of rms per capita indirectly distorts incentives for a rm to
conduct in-house R&D. In this section, we relax this somewhat extreme feature. Along
the lines of Peretto (2007, 2011), we consider the case where socially positive returns to
product variety exist for the production of nal goods as follows:
Yt = n
v
t
Z Nt
0
Xit
 
Zit
Z1 t Lit
1 
di; v > 0;
where the contribution of product variety on nal goods output is assumed to be external
to all agents. In this case, the reduced-form production function of nal goods can be
20Note that initially, the corporate tax rate is set to 0:335, whereas the dividend tax rate is set to 0:35.
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rewritten by
Yt = n

t
l(ct)e
tZt;   v
1   :
The dynamic system of the economy is modied as follows:
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The growth rate of output per workers is given by ~qt 1
h
+  _nt
nt
. Since the steady-state
number of rms per capita is constant, the steady-state growth rate of output is only
dependent of modied q, as is also the case for  = 0. If  > 0, then the steady-state
number of rms per capita is given by (n)
1
1  , where n is consistent with the steady-state
value in the case of  = 0. The other steady-state values coincide with those in the case
of  = 0. That is, social returns to product variety ( > 0) simply add to the direct
positive eect on the production of nal goods, and they only change the steady-state
value of the number of rms per capita; thus, the steady-state eect from tax changes
upon macroeconomic variables is consistent with the case of  = 0.
The impulse responses of key macro variables not involving the growth rate of output
per workers are qualitatively the same as in the case of  = 0. The growth rate of output per
workers is also dependent on the transition growth rate of the number of rms per capita. If
the intensity of the growth rate for the number of rms per capita dominates that for quality
growth, then the impulse response of the growth rate of output per workers is modied.
As an example, Figures 6 (a, b) depict the impulse responses to a 10% point dividend
tax cut in the case of  = 0:3. The gure shows that even if the tax cut is unanticipated
and permanent (or temporary), the growth rate of output per workers initially shows a
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sharp increase. That is, the positive growth rate in the number of rms per capita initially
outweighs the slowdown in quality growth.
In the case of  > 0, household welfare is also dependent of the number of rms per
capita. Higher product variety directly increases household welfare. Table 5 reports the
welfare consequences of tax changes in the cases of  = 0:1; 0:3; 0:5, and 0:7. As the
intensity of social return to product variety, , increases, welfare losses arising from the
dividend tax cut are mitigated, while the welfare gains resulting from the corporate tax cut
increase signicantly. On the other hand, the welfare gains resulting from the capital gains
tax cut increase, while the welfare gains resulting from increases in the R&D tax credit rate
are reduced, but these variations are not signicant compared to the impacts from cuts
in the rate of dividend and corporate taxes. In any tax change, however, the sign of the
welfare eect does not change, and the eect of implementation lags holds qualitatively,
as in the case of the benchmark analysis.
6 Concluding remarks
We rst summarize our results and then discuss their implications.
A dividend tax cut reduces the level of welfare irrespective of implementation method.
After implementation, the tax cut is detrimental to both in-house R&D and aggregate
growth. Consumption and household leisure time also decrease. Therefore, the tax cut
yields overall welfare losses. However, an anticipated tax cut stimulates in-house R&D and
aggregate growth during the pre-implementation announcement phase. Households also
can adjust the timing of their consumption and leisure more smoothly. Both these eects
arising from the foreknowledge of the tax cut have a positive eect on welfare. Therefore,
pre-announcement mitigates the welfare losses compared to the case of an unanticipated
tax cut, although the overall welfare eect still remains negative. On the other hand, the
policy eect of a corporate tax cut is dependent on the specic R&D tax credit rate.
A capital gains tax cut and increases in the R&D tax credit rate lead to welfare gains
irrespective of implementation method. After implementation, these tax changes stimulate
in-house R&D and aggregate growth. The acceleration of quality growth yields welfare
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gains. However, anticipated tax changes are detrimental to in-house R&D and aggregate
growth during the pre-implementation announcement phase. Although anticipated tax
changes lead households to smooth their behavior, which yields a positive eect on welfare,
this positive eect cannot outweigh the negative welfare eect derived from temporary
slowdowns of quality growth. As a result, the pre-announcement of these tax changes
worsens their eectiveness, although the overall welfare eect still remains positive.
Our analysis suggests that a capital gains tax cut and increases in the R&D tax credit
rate are eective policy instruments. However, when considering their implementation in
terms of scope and timing, policy makers should be careful to ensure that their eectiveness
is maximized.
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A Appendices
A.1 Appendix 1
The perfect distribution in the nal goods sector (letting Lit = Lt) yields:
2Yt = NtXt; (A-1)
(1  )Yt = WtNtLt: (A-2)
Using the denition of ct, (A-2), and the market equilibrium condition of labor, NtLt =
etlt, then (15) can be rewritten as (17). Substituting (2) and the market equilibrium
condition of labor to (1) yields (18).
A.2 Appendix 2
Dividing both sides of (16) by Yt and using the denition of nt and ct, (A-1), and (18), we
obtain
1  2   g   ct = nt

l(ct)

+
(Rt; Zt)
Zt
+ 

_nt
nt
+ 

: (A-3)
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Dividing (5) by Zt and using (11), we obtain
(Rt; Zt)
Zt
=
(Sqt)
2   1
2h
: (A-4)
Substituting (A-4) to (A-3), we obtain (19).
From (A-1) together with the denition of nt, and (18), we obtain
Ft
Zt
=

1  


Xt
Zt
  ;
= (1  )
l(ct)
nt
  : (A-5)
Using (A-4), (A-5), and (11), we can rewrite (13) as
rt =
(1  D)(1  )


(1  )
l(ct)
nt
  

  (1  D)(1  )

"
(Sqt)
2   1
2h
#
+ (1  V )Sqt   1
h
:
Then, from the denition of S and , rearranging the above equation yields (22).
From logarithmic dierentiation of ct with respect to time yields
_ct
ct
=
_Ct
Ct
 
_Yt
Yt
= rt   +  
(
_l(ct)
l(ct)
+ +
_Zt
Zt
)
:
Using (17) and (11), the above equation can be rewritten as
_ct
ct
= rt   +  _ct
1 +  ct
  Sqt   1
h
: (A-6)
Rearranging (A-6) yields (20).
From (2), (8), and the market equilibrium condition of labor, we obtain
@Ft
@Zt
= (1  )
l(ct)
nt
: (A-7)
32
Using the denition of S and , (11), and (A-7), we can rewrite (10) as
(1  )
S

l(ct)
nt
+
(Sqt   1)2
2Sh
=
1
1  V rtqt   _qt:
Then, using (17), the above equation is rewritten as (21).
A.3 Appendix 3
The dynamical system of the economy where qt  1 is constituted by
_nt =

1  2   g   ct
 
l(ct)

  [+ ] nt

;
_ct = ct [1 +  ct] [rt   ] ;
_qt =
1
1  V rtqt  
(1  )
S

l(ct)
nt
;
where the interest rate is given by
rt =
(1  V )
S

(1  )
l(ct)
nt
  

:
A.4 Appendix 4
Dierentiating (26) with respect to ~q yields
f 0(~q) 
8>>>>><>>>>>:
241 +   2
1  V
35 ~q
h
+
24 1
1  V   1
35 S + 1
h
 

1  V ; if ~q > 1;
 

1  V ; if ~q  1:
Moreover, second order dierentiation of (26) with respect to ~q yields
f 00(~q) 
8>>>><>>>>:
241 +   2
1  V
35 1
h
< 0; if ~q > 1;
0; if ~q  1:
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Here,
f(1) =

1  V [S   1] +


;
lim
~q!1+0
f 0(~q) =
1
h(1  V ) [V (S   1)  (1  )  h] :
If S  1   (1 V )

(< 1), f(1)  0 and lim~q!1+0 f 0(~q) < 0. Then, f 0(~q) < 0 for
~q > 1 as f 00(~q) < 0 for ~q > 1. Therefore, in this case, f(~q) has only one solution of ~q with a
value less than one. That is, no steady-state equilibrium exists with a positive growth rate
of output. On the other hand, if 1   (1 V )

< S, then f(1) > 0. No matter whether
lim~q!1+0 f 0(~q) < 0 is positive or negative, f(~q) has unique solution of ~q with a value higher
than one, as depicted in Figure 1.
A.5 Appendix 5
Dierentiating the RHS of (26) with respect to D, , V , and  yields
@f(~q)
@D
=


1  V +

1
1  V   1


~q   1
h

1
(1  D)S > 0;
@f(~q)
@
=


1  V +

1
1  V   1


~q   1
h


(1  )S +

2

(1  ) > 0;
@f(~q)
@
=


1  V +

1
1  V   1


~q   1
h


(1  )S  
(1  )
(1  )2 R 0;
=   < 0; if  = 0;
=


1  V +

1
1  V   1


~q   1
h

1
(1  )S > 0; if  = 1;
@f(~q)
@V
=   
(1  V )2 ~q +
~q   1
h(1  V )

S   ~q
1  V

  (~q) R 0:
Since f(~q) is a decreasing function of ~q in the neighborhood around the steady-state solu-
tion, the above derivations imply that ~q is increasing in D,  (if  = 1) and is decreasing
in ,  (if  = 0) and the eects of tax changes in  (if  2 (0; 1)) and V are ambiguous.
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In addition, we also nd
 (1) =   
(1  V )2 < 0;
 0(~q) =
1
(1  V )2h [ 2~q   h+ 1 + S(1  V )] R 0;
 00(~q) =   2
(1  V )2h < 0:
Then, if S < (1 + h)=(1   V ),  (~q) < 0 for ~q > 1. Therefore, it is shown that if
S < (1 + h)=(1  V ), then ~q is a decreasing function of V .
A.6 Appendix 6
We dene 	t  Ut  1  logZt. From the denition of ct, (11), and (18), dierentiating 	t
with respect to time yields
_	t = (  )	t   log 
  log ct   log lt    log (1  lt)  1
  
Sqt   1
h
:
In the steady state, 	t is constant over time. Calculating the dynamic path of 	t nu-
merically using the relaxation algorithm, we can obtain the initial value of 	t, 	0 =
U0   1  logZ0. Without loss of generality, Z0 is normalized to one. Hence, we obtain
U0 = 	0.
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percentage points in the benchmark setting. Solid (Dashed) lines plots the impulse response of
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Table 4: Welfare gains of tax changes (parameter changes)
Tax change Unanticipated
(Permanent)
Anticipated
(Permanent)
Temporary
 = 3:275 (with  = 0:277 and  = 0:125)
tD =  0:1  14:94  12:21  8:52
t =  0:1 5:09 5:76 0:58
tV =  0:1 15:33 12:63 8:3
 = 0:2 11:55 10:3 5:05
 = 9:825 (with  = 0:0945 and  = 0:408)
tD =  0:1  13:7  10:85  8:08
t =  0:1 5:03 5:65 0:66
tV =  0:1 13:04 10:25 7:72
 = 0:2 10:66 9:36 4:81
h = 8:0 (with  = 0:133 and  = 0:267)
tD =  0:1  15:44  11:41  9:98
t =  0:1 5:87 6:55 0:89
tV =  0:1 15:1 11:05 9:7
 = 0:2 12:37 10:37 6:05
h = 18:0 (with  = 0:153 and  = 0:265)
tD =  0:1  12:5  10:55  6:64
t =  0:1 4:2 4:77 0:44
tV =  0:1 12:02 10:15 6:29
 = 0:2 9:39 8:59 3:88
 = 1:0 (with  = 0:0955 and  = 0:260)
tD =  0:1  13:86  11:05  8:08
t =  0:1  13:6  10:83  7:95
tV =  0:1 12:95 10:15 7:69
 = 0:2 17:06 15:0 7:55
 = 0
tD =  0:1  14:23  9:93  7:12
t =  0:1 4:81 4:64 0:53
tV =  0:1 13:5 9:16 6:72
 = 0:2 10:87 8:20 4:18
Note: Welfare gains are measured in consumption equivalent and expressed in percentage points.
Other values of the tax variables and parameters are sames as the benchmark setting.
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percentage points in the case of  = 0:3. Solid (Dashed) lines plots the impulse response of each
variable to the anticipated (unanticipated) tax cut. The circle marks on the left (right) vertical axis
indicates the steady-state level before (after) the tax cut.
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(b) Temporary reduction in the dividend tax cut by 10 percentage points in the case of
 = 0:3. The circle mark on the vertical axis indicates the initial level.
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Table 5: Welfare gains of tax changes (positive social spillover of product variety)
Tax change Unanticipated
(Permanent)
Anticipated
(Permanent)
Temporary
 = 0:1
tD =  0:1  13:08  10:17  7:95
t =  0:1 5:88 6:59 0:83
tV =  0:1 13:73 10:98 7:86
 = 0:2 10:72 9:43 4:82
 = 0:3
tD =  0:1  10:75  7:78  7:12
t =  0:1 8:07 8:88 1:42
tV =  0:1 14:17 11:53 7:85
 = 0:2 10:35 9:1 4:66
 = 0:5
tD =  0:1  7:57  4:65  5:86
t =  0:1 11:08 11:93 2:35
tV =  0:1 14:76 12:25 7:85
 = 0:2 9:87 8:68 4:43
 = 0:7
tD =  0:1  3:07  0:22  4:11
t =  0:1 15:34 16:22 3:61
tV =  0:1 15:54 13:24 7:86
 = 0:2 9:23 8:13 4:13
Note: Welfare gains are measured in consumption equivalent and expressed in percentage points.
Other values of tax variables and parameters are same as the benchmark setting.
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